Regulation EC No. 1007/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 banned the placement of seal products in the EU market. The measure has been very controversial, triggering a strong reaction, both from neighboring exporting States, in particular Canada and Norway, and from indigenous people living in the Arctic region. Seal hunting represents a traditional practice carried out for the purpose of personal consumption of seal meat, as well as for commercial trade of related by-products by the indigenous communities (mainly Inuit) living in the Northern Pole.
G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l The article will first provide a brief description of the normative developments that triggered reaction at different levels-EU and World Trade Organization (WTO)-against the ban on seal products. It will then describe and critically analyze the substantial and procedural legal arguments put forward by the parties and the decisions of the judicial organs. Waiting for a definitive judicial solution of the case, the purpose of this analysis is to clarify and try to solve possible conflicts emerging from the interaction among European policy, EU law, and international law. In particular, Part D will deal with the emerging dispute against the EU institutions brought before the European General Court (before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon known as Court of First Instance) by indigenous groups and individuals. Part E will consider the related WTO dispute raised by Canada and Norway. A third profile, that of the alleged violation of indigenous peoples' cultural identity rights, will be analyzed in Part F. Even though such a dimension of the seals case has not been challenged before any human rights mechanism, Part F will provide an analysis of the international and EU obligations in this regard for States and EU institutions. Some concluding remarks will follow.
B. Trade in Seal Products: The Development of EU Legislation
Seal hunting takes place both as an organized practice and as a one-man activity. The world's three largest seal hunts take place in Canada, West Greenland, and Namibia.
2 Seal hunting is mainly carried out for commercial purposes, including by members of indigenous communities, but there is also an important quota of seal hunting carried out by indigenous populations as part of their culture and identity, providing a source of income and contributing to the subsistence of the hunter. Additionally, seal hunting takes place for the purpose of safeguarding fisheries: reducing the number of seals has an impact on the population of fish that seals rely on for food. 3 The first European Community (EC)/EU seal legislation dates back to the early 1980s when broadcasted practices of cruel killing of certain seal pups sparked public clamor in Europe. In response to such concerns, the EC Council adopted Directive 83/129/EEC ("The Seal Pup The Seals Case and EU Trade Measures Directive"). 4 The Seal Pup Directive initially applied only until 1985, but its effects were later extended for an indefinite period by two subsequent directives. 5 The Seal Pup Directive prohibits the import of seal pup fur skins into the EC market, except for products "resulting from traditional hunting by the Inuit people." 6 As explained in its Preamble, the reason for such exception rests partly on the consideration that exploitation of seals, with due respect for the balance of nature, is a natural and legitimate occupation and forms an important part of the traditional way of life and economy in certain areas of the world. 7 The Preamble also acknowledges that seal hunting, as traditionally practiced by the Inuit people, leaves pups unharmed, and therefore the interests of the Inuit people should not be affected. 8 Additionally, from an environmental perspective, issues related to seal hunting are addressed in the so-called "Habitats Directive" as part of EU's bio-diversity conservation policy. 9 While dealing with broader issues of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the Habitats Directive prohibits the usage of certain weapons and methods of hunting of seals belonging to specific seal populations.
More recently, renewed public pressure on the topic led to the introduction of national bans by some EU Member States (Belgium and the Netherlands in particular) and to the adoption of a European Parliament Resolution proposing a total import ban on seal products. 10 Moreover, almost simultaneously, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (CoE) adopted a Recommendation on the ban of all cruel seal hunting The Seals Case and EU Trade Measures and includes Inupiat, Yupik (Alaska), Inuit, Inuvialuit (Canada), Kalaallit (Greenland), and Yupik (Russia)." 17 Instead, the definition of "other indigenous communities" is provided in the implementation Regulation. These include: communities in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present State boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.
18
It should be noted that Article 2 of the implementation Regulation refers to the narrower concept of "communities" rather than "peoples"-the latter being the concept of reference in the 1989 International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and in the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
19
Quite interestingly, the definition given in the implementation Regulation concerns "communities," but its content is the exact duplication of Article 1 of the ILO Convention, which applies to "peoples." As a corollary, the choice of the wording in the implementation Regulation extends the scope of application of the exception because the products of small communities-that do not necessarily constitute a "people" from the viewpoint of the entity of the group-may be placed on the EU market. Moreover, the use of the term "community" is also a welcomed choice on the part of governments that are generally reluctant to use the term "peoples" because of the rights (in particular self-determination) that may be attached to this concept under international law. 20 See ILO C169, supra note 19, art. 1 (specifying that the use of the term "peoples" shall not be construed as having the implications recognized under international law). G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l As specified in the implementation Regulation, however, not all products originating from "Inuit and other indigenous communities" may be freely placed on the EU market. The derogation to the ban on seal products is drafted in much narrower terms because three additional requirements must be simultaneously fulfilled.
First, products must originate from seal hunts conducted by Inuit or other indigenous communities that have a seal hunting tradition. Thus, for each Inuit community and "other indigenous communities" within the above-mentioned definition, it should be also assessed whether there has been a tradition of seal hunting in the community in question and in the geographical region, and whether sealing is part of its cultural heritage. 21 Second, only seal products that are partly consumed on the local market or processed within the communities according to their traditions will benefit from the exemption. 22 Third, seal products by Inuit and other indigenous communities may be placed on the EU market only if seal hunts contribute to the subsistence of the community. 23 Although the concrete meaning of "subsistence hunt" is not clear, the Regulation seems to introduce a distinction between this and hunts performed for other purposes: Only the former is consistent with the exemption contained in Regulation 1007/2009. A systematic interpretation of Regulations 1007/2009 and 737/2010 (notably the general emphasis on communities, the recognition of both economic and social interests of indigenous communities engaged in seal hunting, and the reference to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) 24 would suggest a broad interpretation of the term "subsistence"-one that refers to the maintenance, protection, and development of indigenous communities, culture, and identity rather than to mere economic survival. This interpretation is also suggested in the Commission's study on implementing measures for trade in seal products (hereafter COWI Report), in which it is submitted that "hunt for subsistence" should be assessed at the community level, not at individual level, and it should not be a large-scale commercial hunt.
25
Considering that the main sealing countries at the global level are Canada, Greenland, and Namibia, a preliminary assessment of the Inuit and other indigenous communities that are likely to fulfill the different conditions of the exemption from the ban on seal products is of 21 See Commission Regulation 737/2010, supra note 13, at pmbl. indent 3, art. 3.1(a). 22 Id. at pmbl. indent 3, art. 3.1(b). 23 Id. at pmbl. indent 3, art. 3.1(c). 24 central importance in relation to the implementation in practice of the EU Regulations. Such an effort has been made in the above mentioned COWI Report, which considers the situation in Alaska, Canada, Greenland, Namibia, Norway, Russia, and in three EU Member States (Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom).
The Report asserts that in Greenland about 90% of the total population is Inuit. Seal products resulting from these communities are likely to comply with the Regulation because sealing has been traditionally an integral part of their culture, and hunting is executed for using the whole animal. 26 Likewise, seal hunting in Alaska by two Inuit communities (Yupik and Inupiat) 27 and by the sub-Arctic indigenous Aleut community living in the Aleutian Islands is also likely to comply with the EU Regulations. These communities have traditionally hunted seals for thousands of years. Hunt products are part of their diet, and seal hunts are seen as a contribution to their social and cultural traditions.
28
Concerning Canada, the COWI Report clarifies that seal hunting is both an organized commercial activity regulated by law on the basis of commercial licenses and a traditional activity performed by Inuit communities and various other aboriginal coastal communities as an essential part of their culture and economy. The latter type of hunt merely constitutes approximately three percent of the total hunting in Canada, and only products therefrom would probably qualify for the exemption. 29 In Russia as well, there are several indigenous groups (both Inuit and other indigenous communities), and it is likely that part of these communities will also pass the test stipulated in the EU Regulations. 30 In Sweden and Norway, traditional seal hunting is carried out by some coastal Sami communities and serves as a complementary income source. To the extent that hunting activities do not involve large-scale trade for the sole purpose of placing seal products on the market, such products would potentially fulfill the conditions set out in the Regulations. 31 Finally, the COWI Report concludes that seal hunt conducted in Namibia, UK, and Finland will probably not qualify for the exemption in Article 3.1 of Regulation 1007/2009 because the hunt is not undertaken by Inuit and other indigenous communities or for subsistence purposes.
32 26 See id. at 28-30. 27 See Council Regulation 1007/2009, supra note 12, at art. 2.4 (mentioning these two communities specifically).
28 COWI, supra note 25, at 23-24. 29 See id. at 24-27, 42. 30 See id. at 32. 31 See id. at 30-31, 33. 32 See id. at 27, 30, 33. [Vol. 14 No. 01 286 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l
II. "Placing on the Market of Seal Products" and Beyond
The ban contained in Regulation 1007/2009 refers to the "placing on the market of seal products." 33 It is also specified that the conditions for placing on the market "shall apply at the time or point of imports for imported products." 34 However, the Regulations do not clarify whether seal products not complying with the conditions set out in Article 3 shall be denied access into Union territory, even if the purpose is not their placement on the market but simple transit through Union territory towards the market of a third country. While the EU ban certainly concerns (1) the placing on the market of seal products that do not comply with the requirements for exemption (mainly in relation to seal products originating in EU Member States) and (2) the import of such incompatible products in the EU for the purpose of placing them on the market, it is not clear whether it will also have an impact on products in transit.
In principle, the ban should not cover goods in transit: Article 3 is entitled "conditions for placing on the market" and not "conditions for entry into the EU market." As a corollary, such conditions should not be applied separately from the purpose for which they were introduced, namely "placement on the market" of seal products. 35 However, considering the broad definition of "import" in Regulation 1007/2009-"any entry of goods in the customs territory of the Community" 36 (emphasis added)-and that conditions for exemption are enforced at the EU border, the COWI Report reaches partly a different conclusion. It assumes a distinction between a mere transit scenario and a transit and processing scenario. 37 The first concerns transit in the form of transport "under customs supervision through the customs territory of the [Union] with a final destination in a third country", 38 and activities of auction houses serving as intermediaries between non-EU sellers and non-EU buyers with no "physical" placement on the EU market: These should not be covered by the Regulations. 34 
Id.
35 See Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose") (emphasis added). However, the Council Regulation is not properly a treaty, but rather a secondary source based on a treaty. 36 Council Regulation 1007/2009, supra note 13, at art. 2.5. 37 COWI, supra note 25, at 62. 38 Id. at 12. 39 Id. at 62. The Seals Case and EU Trade Measures
The second scenario involves products originating outside the EU, which are processed within the EU and are intended for non-EU consumers. In such cases, the COWI Report submits that compliance with Article 3 would be compulsory. 40 Nevertheless, the COWI Report also acknowledges the likelihood of challenges to the implementation in practice and cites the example of a German tannery that processes third party (non-EU) sealskins that are later exported to non-EU States without any change of ownership of the products during processing. 41 Even though processing is a value-adding activity that takes place within the EU in exchange for payment, comprising such a case within the scope of application of the Regulations would require a broad interpretation of the notion "placing on the market" "[by] making available to third parties in exchange for payment" 42 -i.e., also making physically available without changes in ownership rights.
Finally, concerning the geographical scope of application, the two Regulations have "European Economic Area (EEA) relevance." This underscores the special situation of Norway, which is part of the European Economic Area. Homogeneity within the EEA implies that EU secondary legislation has to be timely incorporated in the EEA Agreement through appropriate amendments. However, the EEA Joint Committee has not taken any decision in this regard until now. Depending on whether Norway will be included in the regulation as an EEA Member is expected to have consequences on the shift of seal-related activities (for instance, processing and auctioning) from EU Member States, such as Denmark and Germany, to Norway, due to geographic proximity. 43 As earlier anticipated, the adoption of the Regulation triggered a strong reaction both from the Inuit communities and their representative organizations, as well as from some of the States-Canada and Norway-in which such communities live and are more broadly involved in trade in seal products for commercial purposes. This reaction was voiced before EU judicial organs by individuals and groups directly concerned by the ban 44 and by non EU-States before the WTO dispute settlement organs. The issues raised in these different forums will be analyzed in turn. 40 Id. 47 In relation to the first action for annulment, the applicants also submitted to the President of the GC two requests for provisional suspension of the application of the disputed Regulations until the decision on annulment had been rendered.
48
In the main actions for annulment, 49 the applicants contended that the European Parliament (EP) and the Council had not adequately demonstrated why intervention at the EU level was necessary. Given that only two Member States (Belgium and the Netherlands) had already introduced a ban on seal products, the applicants argued that the EU institutions had infringed the subsidiarity principle.
50
The principle of proportionality had also been violated because less intrusive measures (e.g., labeling requirements) would have been sufficient to meet the stated goals of the Regulation. The GC has until now eluded the analysis of these issues by declaring the application inadmissible for lack of locus standi, in particular for lack of "direct and individual concern" under Article 263(4) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
58
Its restrictive interpretation of the conditions upon which natural or legal persons may contest EU acts, although justifiable to some extent, has an important impact on the substantial protection of their rights and raises a delicate issue of compatibility of the EU judicial system with the right to effective access to judicial remedies stipulated in both the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The appeal case before the ECJ against the order of inadmissibility of the GC is still in progress. Awaiting the Court's judgment on the annulment action, the applicants also requested the provisional suspension of the operation of Regulation 1007/2009 by the President of the GC. 60 Although the President found the request to be prima facie admissible, he finally dismissed the application for interim suspension on the basis of lack of urgency.
61
The applicants argued that as a result of the ban introduced by Regulation 1007/2009 they would suffer "serious and irreparable harm," because the exemption in favor of Inuit and other indigenous communities is a sort of "empty box."
62 They underlined that Inuit people do not export products themselves, but rely on bigger exportation chains that are also used for seal products obtained from commercial hunts. 63 Since the latter would be denied access to the Union market after the Regulation went into effect, Inuit and indigenous exempted products would also, in practice, lose access to the EU market, which has been very important for the Inuit economy. 64 Moreover, the applicants stressed that, similar to the Seal Pups Directive, the Regulation would have an adverse impact on the image of seal products in general, which would cause the collapse of the market for seal products.
The President thus had to decide whether the concerns highlighted by the applicants fulfilled the "urgency" requirement in relation to the adoption of interim measures, namely the need to avoid "serious and irreparable damage to the party seeking relief."
66
In this regard, he underlined that the damage should be certain or at least shown with a sufficient degree of probability and that damage of purely pecuniary nature cannot be regarded as irreparable since it can be subject of financial reparation. 67 The President affirmed that the grant of an interim measure would be justified if the applicants could prove their impossibility of continuing to live according to their culture and traditions on account of the regime laid down by the Regulation. 68 The Seals Case and EU Trade Measures However, the President summarily dismissed the concerns of the applicants, affirming, on the one hand, that the "empty box" argument was raised too early: It could have been adequately addressed only after the adoption of the implementing measures by the Commission. 69 On the other hand, in contrast with the clear conclusions contained in the impact assessment, 70 the President rejected a comparison with the adverse effects of the Seal Pup Directive and established that the applicants had not "proved the existence of circumstances giving rise to urgency such as to justify the grant of interim measures."
71

II. The Second Request for Interim Suspension of Regulation 1007/2009
Later the same year, the applicants lodged a second request for interim suspension of Regulation 1007/2009 on the basis of new facts.
72
They substantially renewed the argument on the Inuit exception being an "empty box" in light of the Commission's draft regulation spelling out the measures for the implementation of the exception in favor of Inuit and indigenous communities. 73 The day before the anticipated effective date of Regulation 1007/2009 (20 August 2010), the President of the Court ordered, so far as concerns the applicants, a temporary suspension of the restrictive conditions introduced by the Regulation until the adoption of a final decision on the second request for interim measures.
74
The suspension was received with enthusiasm from Inuit groups and commercial sealers; however, it is worth noting that its practical effects were of little or no relevance. First, the suspension only applied to the limited group of applicants in the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others case. 75 Second, it only applied until the second request for interim measures was decided, not the main annulment issue. Indeed, the suspension was removed a few months later when the President of the General Court dismissed the application for interim 69 See id. at para. 112. 70 See Impact Assessment, supra note 2. 73 See id. at paras. 20-23. 74 Id. 75 
Id.
80 76 See id. In December 2010, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others brought an appeal against the Order of the President before the General Court (Case C-605/10 P(R)) but there was no need to adjudicate because, in the meantime, the General Court had adopted its decision on the main action for annulment. Case C-605/10 P(R), Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2011 E.C.R. II-____. 77 The President took the view that:
[I]t is admittedly conceivable that the relatively late official publication of the implementing regulation could delay the implementation of the Inuit exception in so far as concerns the marketing on the European Union market of seal products deriving from hunting by Greenlandic Inuit. However, although that delay may damage the 'Inuit economy' of Greenland, the applicants do not establish that the implementing regulation is objectively impracticable, the arguments put forward to that effect being mere unsubstantiated general assertions, whereas they should have provided specific evidence and proved the facts alleged to form the basis of the likelihood of the impracticability alleged, since damage of a purely hypothetical nature cannot justify the ordering of the suspension of operation sought.
Id. at para 86. 78 See id. 79 See id. at para. 52. 80 See id. at para. 54. The Seals Case and EU Trade Measures
The approach adopted in the order cripples the position of the applicants. First, it quashed the collective argument of the harm to the surviving interests of the Arctic Inuit Community in general. Second, the fragmentation of applicants' requests into a number of individual positions amounts to a higher test for successfully establishing the seriousness of the damage alleged. Third, the order puts forward the argument that States and their regional bodies bear the responsibility for protecting general economic, social, and cultural interests; it thus suggests that group rights-in the case at issue, indigenous peoples' rights-can only be voiced through States or intra-State bodies and that non-governmental organizations or associations set up for the purpose of promoting and strengthening the rights of such groups have no power in this regard. 81 This interpretation points out the problematic issue of the scope and purpose of EU judicial review-whether and to what extent it also has the function of protecting diffuse public interests against legislative or administrative abuse.
82 By overlooking the important presence among the applicants of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) Greenland, the order obviously rejects a broader reading of the purposes of EU judicial review.
83
III. The Actions for Annulment: A Mirage of New Opportunities for Private Applicants?
In the main action for annulment, 84 the GC tackles the case only from a procedural perspective of admissibility under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU (previously, Art. 230 Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC)) which establishes the conditions under which natural or legal persons may contest the legitimacy of EU acts. The GC found that the applicants lacked locus standi and declared the case inadmissible. 85 An important corollary of this decision is that the GC sidestepped the discussion on the merits of the claims of the applicants concerning the appropriateness of the balance struck in the Regulations between the rights of indigenous peoples and concerns for animal welfare in the light of human rights principles.
Individual Applicants Challenging EU General Acts: ECJ's Traditional Restrictive Reading
Traditionally, the ECJ has adopted a most restrictive interpretation of Art. 230(4) TEC 86 in regards to the possibility for private individuals and groups to challenge the legality of a measure of general application (such as a regulation) addressed to one or more Member States.
87
Under Article 230 TEC, natural or legal persons could challenge either acts (mainly Decisions) addressed to them or measures of general application (i.e., Regulations) by providing evidence that the act was of "direct and individual concern" for them. 88 To that end, the EC set a very high threshold for the fulfillment of the criterion of "individual concern" (the so-called Plaumann formula), requiring proof that the measure affected the applicants "by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons." The demanding fulfillment of the "individual concern" test left in practice no other possibility for private parties than to challenge the general measure indirectly, via the preliminary review procedure (Art. 234 TEC); however, within certain limits, this path and the exact content of the issue that is referred to European judges is upon the discretion of national judicial organs.
As such, the mechanism under Article 230 TEC was undermined by important protection gaps. In particular, in cases in which the acts of general application did not entail implementing measures (and therefore individuals could not challenge the domestic implementing measure before domestic courts), the option left to applicants that could not presumably fulfill the "direct and individual concern" test was to violate the rules laid down by the regulation. They could thus obtain a sanction and rely on the invalidity of the regulation as a defense in the proceedings before national courts with the aim of possibly having the case referred to the ECJ.
These loopholes in the EU system of judicial remedies for individuals were addressed in two cases: UPA v. Council and Jégo-Quéré v. Commission in 2002 and 2004, respectively. 90 Notwithstanding the proposal to relax the "individual concern" test by taking into account the "substantial adverse effects" of the measure on the interests of the applicant by reason of his particular circumstances, 91 the ECJ reconfirmed in such cases its traditional restrictive reading of the conditions under Article 230 TEC. The ECJ added, however, that any change of that approach had to be introduced through legislative reform of the Treaties. 
Challenging "Regulatory Acts": The Change Introduced by the Lisbon Treaty
Taking into account the debate on these issues, the Lisbon Treaty inserts in Article 263(4) TFEU an additional possibility of judicial review of the legality of EU measures by individuals. 93 The new provision maintains in place the old test (and consequently the case law developed in that regard) but also adds a third limb stipulating that private parties may 90 92 See UPA, supra note 90, at para. 45; Jégo-Quéré, supra note 90, at para. 36. 93 See TFEU, supra note 44, at art. 263(4) ("Any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and second paragraphs, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures."). G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l challenge "a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures." In other words, with respect to "regulatory acts" that do not entail implementing measures, private parties no longer need to establish "individual concern." In principle, the novelty introduced by Article 263(4) TFEU constitutes a relaxation of the rules on standing because individuals would only have to meet the "direct concern" testnamely, show that the measure directly affects their legal situation and that no discretion is left to the addressees of the measure. 94 However, the Lisbon Treaty contains no definition of what is a "regulatory act."
95
As the first case to be decided under Article 263(4) TFEU, 96 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others is of great interest because the GC had the opportunity to offer some clarification as well as its own interpretation in relation to the possibility for natural or legal persons to review the legality of EU "regulatory acts." 
The Scope of Application of Art. 263(4) TFEU: The GC's Reading
Regarding the definition of a "regulatory act," the GC adopted a narrow approach, taking the view that it must be understood as covering "all acts of general application apart from legislative acts. Consequently, a legislative act may form the subject-matter of an action for annulment brought by natural or legal persons only if it is of direct and individual concern to them." 98 94 It has been authoritatively highlighted that there may be a possible overlap between the two requirements in Art. 263 (4) The rationale behind this approach is that if acts are adopted through a legislative procedure, the concerns of citizens have already been taken into account through their representatives in the EU institutions (such as the Council and the EP). Instead, if the procedure for the adoption of EU acts has not involved representative institutions, such acts should be subject to greater scrutiny precisely because of a lower level of legitimacy. The GC grounds its interpretation, mainly, in the drafting history of Article 263, which, however, is known to be the result of a legislative oversight during the process of "switching" from the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe ("Constitutional Treaty") to the Lisbon Treaty.
99
The appeal of the order of the GC currently pending before the ECJ will provide it with the opportunity to reconsider the overall coherence of the EU system of judicial review of EU acts in a post-Lisbon context. Additionally, the tangible effects of the new provision in Article 263(4) will depend on how strictly the Court will interpret the "direct concern" test and the repetitive requirement that the act "does not entail implementing measures."
100
In this regard, it also remains to be seen how the GC will solve the admissibility issue in the second annulment action brought by Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others against the Commission's implementing Regulation 737/2010, which was adopted with a nonlegislative procedure.
101
The new possibility introduced in the Lisbon Treaty certainly broadens the chances for individuals and groups to challenge the legitimacy of EU acts by comparison to the protection available under the Nice Treaty.
102 However, there are some arguments that may be invoked as an alternative to the narrow interpretation of Article 263(4) espoused by the GC, grounded on a strict link between the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty.
First, under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the travaux preparatoires represent a subsidiary means of interpretation.
103 Instead, the general rule 99 See id. at para. 49. The Constitutional Treaty contained an identical provision to that of Article 263(4) TFEU, but it also introduced new categories of legal instruments: a European regulation was defined as a non-legislative act, "traditional" regulations were renamed European laws. 100 See Condinanzi, supra note 9494.
101 Given, however, that Reg. 737/2010 requires Member States to designate the competent authorities for the verification of attesting documents for imported seal products (Art. 9), the Court will presumably conclude that Art. 263(4) TFEU does not apply to the petitioners in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami. 102 See supra text accompanying note 93.
103 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 35, at art. 32. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that "Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l of interpretation in Article 31(1) stipulates that the interpreter should first refer to the "ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context" 104 (textual interpretation) in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty (teleological interpretation). Provided that the term "regulatory act" cannot be found elsewhere in the Treaty, its ordinary meaning in the context of Article 263 and in the context of the Lisbon Treaty more broadly could be established on the basis of its affinity with the term "regulation."
The GC argues that "regulatory acts" are "acts of general application."
105 This is correct; however, the following step of the reasoning-namely that they are non-legislative actsis not necessarily supported by textual interpretation. Indeed, alternative to the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty maintains in place existing legal instruments, including regulations, and the distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts is not based on the function of the different categories of acts but rather on the type of procedure employed for their adoption.
106
Therefore, the specification that the acts considered in Article 263(1) are "legislative acts," may also suggest that "regulatory acts" mentioned in Article 263(4) comprise both legislative and non-legislative acts.
107
Second, a broader interpretation of Article 263 (4) is welcomed because the one currently provided by the GC does not adequately address the practical problems concerning the right of access to a court underlined in the UPA and Jégo-Quéré cases. In this regard, it should be recalled that the purpose of the introduction of the third limb was precisely to address the above-mentioned problem of lack of remedies for individuals in the absence of national implementing measures to be challenged before domestic courts. A narrow reading of Article 263 would still fail to offer a solution in the case of legislative acts of general application (typically the UPA case). Indeed, the GC's formalistic reading-i.e., regulatory acts defined on the basis of the procedure employed for their adoption-of the more relaxed locus standi conditions leaves no room for discretion aimed at filling in the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."). Id. 104 See id. at art. 31 ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."). 106 See TFEU, supra note 44, at art. 289(3) ("Legal acts adopted by legislative procedure shall constitute legislative acts."). loopholes in the EU judicial system in cases of substantial adverse effects on the interests of the applicant by reason of his particular circumstances.
In any case, it is desirable that the ECJ will not extend the Textilwerke Deggendorf (TWD) 108 case law on "one way exclusivity" between the annulment action and the preliminary reference on validity to the third limb of Article 263(4) TFEU.
109
Third, a narrow interpretation of Article 263 is also problematic under the perspective of the distinct, but strictly related, issue of the right of access to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is invoked in case of violation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union. 110 The right to effective judicial protection was already recognized by the ECJ as a general principle of community law stemming from the constitutional traditions common to Member States. 111 After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the provision of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights enshrining such principle achieved the same value of the Treaties.
112
Moreover, Article 19(1) TEU establishes that " ember States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law."
Concerning the right of access to an effective remedy, in the UPA case, Advocate General acobs questions whether in the absence of the "individual interest" requirement the preliminary ruling procedure before national courts provides an effective remedy.
113 He first highlights the circumstance that applicants before domestic courts do not have an automatic right to the preliminary review procedure nor can they decide which measures will be referred to the ECJ or the grounds of invalidity. . G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l impossibility for national courts to declare the invalidity of EU acts on their own. 115 Third, it is objected that legal certainty necessitates immediate review of the act-not after the adoption of implementing measures. 116 Moreover, indirect challenges of EU acts through the preliminary review procedure may involve important delays and additional costs, which could be reduced in the case of direct challenges under the annulment procedure. Fourth, the delays involved in the preliminary review procedure may require the adoption of interim measures. However, the criteria for awarding such measures change from State to State, and this may, in practice, cause contradictory or discriminatory results for the applicants. Moreover, interim measures awarded by a domestic court are confined to the Member State in question.
117
E. The Dispute at the WTO Level
The EU ban on seal products is currently also the subject of a dispute brought by Canada and Norway before the WTO. 118 The WTO approach to this dispute is fundamentally different from the EU approach for two primary reasons. First, it is a government-togovernment dispute. Under WTO rules, individuals and groups, including both indigenous communities and firms operating in the seal products industry, do not have the right to be heard or the right to participate in the proceedings, except for the limited possibility that written briefs are accepted to be considered by the panels or the Appellate Body, which is at their discretion.
119 Second, the WTO approaches the disputed issue from a technical trade law perspective, and as WTO case law shows, in principle, non-trade considerations have limited room for application. Therefore, the problem of the impact of the EU (Feb. 14, 2011) . Argentina, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Iceland, Japan, Mexico, Norway, and the United States have joined as third parties. At its meeting on 25 March 2011, the Dispute Settlement Body established a panel. China, Colombia, Iceland, Japan, Mexico, Norway, and the United States, and subsequently Argentina, Ecuador and the Russian Federation, reserved their third party rights. The two requests will be addressed by a single panel. On 4 October 2012, the Director-General composed the panel. 119 The issue of the admissibility of amicus curiae submissions in WTO dispute settlement proceedings is highly contentious. However, the Appellate Body has confirmed the panels' discretion as well as its own authority to accept or reject information and advice from interested entities, which are neither parties nor third parties to the dispute. ore specifically, they assert that the EU measure discriminates among "like products" (seal products and non-seal products; Inuit seal products and seal products in general) originating in different countries in violation of the most favored nation treatment rule enshrined in GATT Article I(1) and Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement. The EU regime allegedly further violates the national treatment rule established in Article III(4) of the GATT and in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement as it apparently discriminates between imported products and "like products" originating in the EU. Alternatively, the EU ban may be perceived as a quantitative restriction on trade violating Article XI(1) of the GATT or as an introduction of a non-tariff measure on agricultural products in contrast with AoA Article 4.2. Canada and Norway claim as well a violation of Article 2.2. of the TBT Agreement, which provides that the adoption of technical regulations should not pose an "unnecessary obstacle to international trade."
The following sections will address some of the problematic issues on which the WTO Panel will presumably focus in order to decide on the compatibility of the EU measures with WTO obligations.
I. The Relationship Between the GATT and the TBT Agreement
Concerning the alleged violation of the most favored nation and national treatment rules, it is worth clarifying that despite being drafted in similar terms in the GATT and in the TBT Agreement, the conditions upon which such provisions apply differ. The approach of the two agreements is also quite different. The GATT contains a general prohibition of restrictive trade measures unless they are justified, for instance, under GATT Article XX. The TBT Agreement, instead, sets out the requirements that legitimate technical regulations and standards must fulfill; it thus assumes their legality in principle, provided that they fulfill the requirements established in the Agreement. 120 Consequently, the WTO Panel will have to decide first which agreement applies in the case at issue. 120 The sixth recital of the Preamble of the TBT Agreement clarifies this point:
Recognizing that no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the In EC-Asbestos, the Panel addressed the issue of the relationship between the GATT and the TBT Agreement and clarified that, while the applicability of one or of the other cannot be excluded a priori, as both are part of Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement, the order in which they apply should prioritize the agreement that deals "specifically and in detail" with the measure in question. 121 Accordingly, provided that the TBT agreement is the more specific one, the Panel will have to ascertain first whether the EU ban on seal products constitutes a "technical regulation" pursuant to paragraph 1 of Annex I of the TBT Agreement.
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II. The EU Measure: Compliance with the TBT Agreement
Annex I of the TBT Agreement defines a "technical regulation" as a " [d] ocument which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and production methods . . . with which compliance is mandatory."
123 The EU Regulation lays down in a mandatory form the process and production methods (i.e., traditional indigenous hunt) for the marketing of seal products in the EU. 124 However, it is not clear whether the EU measure would match the definition of "technical regulation" because there is high legal uncertainty on whether the TBT Agreement covers technical regulations relating to "process and production methods" (PP s) that are not strictly associated to the production of a specific good and that are not detectable in the final product. Indeed, non-product related PPMs are generally considered to fall outside of the scope of the TBT Agreement. 125 levels it considers appropriate, subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Trade, pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994 , 1994 . 122 The TBT Agreement also applies to standards, but these consist of rules compliance with which is not mandatory. 123 TBT, supra note 120, at annex 1, para. 1. 124 Regulation 1007/09, supra note 12, art. 3. 125 The text of the TBT does not suggest any interpretation of PPMs, but the view generally held on this issue is to interpret the word "relate" in the definition of technical regulations as meaning "having a physical impact on the end product. Nevertheless, it could also happen that if neither party wants to exclude the applicability of the TBT on this ground, the Panel may not address this point. 126 Further, to establish a violation of Article 2.1 TBT, Canada and Norway will have to provide evidence of a prima facie case that imported products are treated "less favorably" than foreign or domestic "like products." The Appellate Body (AB) has clarified that this should be assessed by examining whether the measure modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant market, whether de jure or de facto, to the detriment of imported products and that a "genuine relationship" should exist between the measure itself and its adverse impact on competitive opportunities.
World Trade Organization Agreement on Technical Barriers to
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Additionally, under Article 2.2. TBT "[m]embers shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade." In other words, technical regulations must "not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would create." 128 (emphasis added). The EU measure could in principle satisfy the "legitimate objective" test because the non-exhaustive list in TBT Article 2.2. explicitly mentions the "protection of animal life or health." By contrast, the necessity test may not be fulfilled because it could be argued that a general certification and labeling regime would have been a less trade restrictive "reasonably available" alternative for the EU in relation to the objective pursued. 129 In this regard, the AB has clarified that a II] . G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l measure does not cease to be "reasonably available" simply because it involves administrative difficulties for a Member.
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If the applicability of the TBT Agreement is excluded, the legitimacy of the EU measure will have to be assessed under the GATT.
III. The EU Measure: Compliance with the GATT
Articles I and III of the GATT prohibit discrimination between "like products" originating in different countries and between domestic and foreign "like products." 131 The latter is a key concept (the same applies to TBT Article 2.1) because, if products are not "like products," States may subject them to different regimes without incurring a violation. Thus, the first issue to be assessed will be whether the seal products covered by the EU ban should be considered "like products" by comparison to products not covered by the ban, such as: (1) products not originating from seals (e.g., pelts from other animals, Omega-3 capsules not obtained from seals) and (2) seal products originating from indigenous traditional hunt. The decision as to what products are comparable will have an important impact on the final solution of the case.
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In the absence of a legal definition of the notion of "likeness," the jurisprudence of the WTO adjudicatory bodies on this topic provides some clarification. First, the assessment of the "likeness" between two or more products is to be made on a case-by-case basis. Second, the notion of likeness is not uniform across or within the WTO agreements but has to be interpreted in the specific context of the provisions which make use of it. In this regard, the AB uses the image of an "accordion [that] (4) ("The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use."). Third, and quite importantly, the AB explains that the concept involves "a determination about the nature and extent of a competitive relationship between and among products" 134 and identifies four general criteria:
(i) the physical properties of the products; (ii) the extent to which the products are capable of serving the same or similar end-uses; (iii) the extent to which consumers perceive and treat the products as alternative means of performing particular functions in order to satisfy a particular want or demand; and (iv) the international classification of the products for tariff purposes.
135
Under the third criterion, consumers' concerns on animal welfare could, in principle, become relevant for excluding the likeness between seal products and either products not originating from seals or indigenous seal products. The EU measure would thus be safe because GATT rules allow States to subject "non-like products" to different regimes. However, there is no clear favorable WTO jurisprudence in relation to the relevance of PP s concerning the assessment of "likeness" between products.
136 Rather, the AB has specified that an overall determination of the evidence relating to each of the four criteria has to be made. 137 In other terms, physical properties, end uses and tariff classification of products will also be considered in determining the issue of "likeness." oreover, when considering the issue of a possible violation of GATT Article I, it should be recalled that the EU measure substantially (and de facto) affects Canada and Norway since exports of seal products from these countries to the EU are quite significant.
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As an alternative to a violation of GATT Articles I and III, Canada and Norway also claim a violation of Article XI, which prohibits all non-tariff barriers that are applied at the border 133 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, para. 21, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) . 134 Asbestos, supra note 130, para. 99. Although the considerations here made reference to the assessment of a likeness of products under Article III(4) of the GATT 1994, they nevertheless provide guidance for a general approach to the issue. 135 See id. at para. 101. 136 In Asbestos, for instance, the Appellate Body took into consideration consumer tastes for the purpose of distinguishing products containing asbestos from other fungible products. It is questionable, however, whether in assessing likeness consumer preferences as to animal welfare are equivalent to their perception of the health risks posed by asbestos. 137 Asbestos, supra note 130, at para. 109.
138 Impact Assessment, supra note 129, at [46] [47] 53 . G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l (including bans) and limit market access. 139 On the one hand, violation of Article XI is easier to demonstrate. Differently from the case of an alleged violation of Articles I and III, the applicants do not have to show any discriminatory intent or effect. On the other hand, however, Articles III and XI pursue different objectives: Unlike Article III, Article XI concerns border measures rather than internal regulations. 140 Even though in principle the EU measure applies to both internal and imported products, the portion of the Regulation providing that the conditions for placing on the market seal products "shall apply at the time or point of import for imported products" 141 raises an issue of compatibility with Article XI and may be considered as a quantitative restriction.
In any case, if the measure is found to violate GATT Article I, Article III, both Articles I and III (because the likeness test is fulfilled and the measure is discriminatory) or Article XI, the Regulation can nevertheless be saved by resorting to the general exceptions provision under GATT Article XX. This Article provides that States may derogate from the general principles by adopting or enforcing measures necessary to pursue one of the policy objectives listed therein and upon fulfillment of the conditions set out in the opening provisions of the Article (chapeau requirements).
142
The purpose "to safeguard public morals" 143 and "to protect animal life or health" 144 could, in theory, justify the EU measure, but it is doubtful whether the necessity test and the chapeau requirements, as interpreted by the Panels and the AB, would be satisfied. As The Seals Case and EU Trade Measures earlier noted, the preliminary works of the EU regulation, as well as the assessment report made by the Commission, confirm that there were less trade restrictive available options for the EU to adopt (for instance, banning only products for which inhumane killing occurred by introducing a certification regime). Moreover, WTO case law does not clearly establish whether or to what extent unilateral import bans imposed as a reaction to events occurring beyond the jurisdiction of the enacting State can be justified under GATT Art. XX. 145 Further, if the purpose of the regulation is to respond to a general European concern over cruel killing methods that do not guarantee the death of animals without suffering, the choice of the EU institutions to address this problem only in relation to seals is not easily defendable under the chapeau conditions in Art. XX.
In sum, one of the general questions underlying the seals dispute concerns the extent to which WTO rules should limit the domestic policies of its members. However, it must be stressed that the object of the examination by WTO dispute settlement organs is not the choice of policy as such, but rather the way it is implemented and whether it respects the rights of other States under the WTO multilateral regime. Accordingly, the interpretation and application of the "necessity" test in the context of the TBT and GATT Article XX and the chapeau requirements in Article XX will settle such threshold.
Additionally, in the light of the considerations noted and from a wider perspective, the decision of the Panel will necessarily have an impact on the broader issue of the openness of the WTO system to morally based concerns enforced through trade bans. 146 Despite the occasional accommodation of non-trade interests in the application of WTO law, several provisions under the different WTO Agreements may exclude the compatibility of the EU 145 Concerning the general exception under GATT Art. XX(g) on the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, the Panel in US-Tuna II asserted that "[i]t could not therefore be said that the General Agreement proscribe [s] in an absolute manner measures that relate to things or actions outside the territorial jurisdiction of the party taking the measure." See Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on the Imports of Tuna, para. 5.16, DS29/R (June 16, 1994) . However, in the US-Shrimp Appellate Body report, it is clarified that in pursuing fundamental social policies States are bound to "to have prior consistent recourse to diplomacy " failure to do so may produce a discriminatory impact. See US-Shrimp, supra note 119, at para. 187. Nov. 10, 2004) . In both cases the decision organs failed to justify State measures under Art. XX. As this concerns the seals case, it has been authoritatively suggested that this case may not be the most appropriate one for establishing a precedent under Art. XX(a). See Fitzgerald, supra note 132, at 86. regulations with WTO obligations, concerning in particular the way measures are applied in practice. Further, case law shows that reconciliation between trade and other policy objectives is more difficult when the policy aim (e.g., animal welfare) is not explicitly included in the WTO agreements or in the general exceptions or if it reflects local ethical and moral positions rather than "universally" agreed standards.
147 Indeed, it should be noted that the specific issue in the disputed case concerns animal welfare and not animal protection for preservation and environmental purposes. There are very few animal welfare international agreements concerned specifically with the physical and emotional well-being of animals 148 -with the exception of acts of extreme cruelty, animal welfare still remains at the level of personal preferences and cultural choices. 
F. The (Possible) Human Rights Path
Besides animal welfare concerns and the pure trade dimension, the seals case can also be read from the viewpoint of the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples and in particular of their right to culture. Even though the EU ban has not been challenged on such grounds before any human rights mechanism, it is important to clarify the existing obligations under international law for States and for EU Members.
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I. Specific Instruments on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
At the international level, the only binding instrument that specifically denotes the rights of indigenous people is the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of 1989 (ILO C169).
151 Among the EU Member States, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain have ratified the Convention. A more recent, broader but non-binding document has been adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Handicrafts, rural and community based industries and subsistence economy and traditional activities of the peoples concerned, such as hunting, fishing, trapping and gathering, shall be recognized as important factors in the maintenance of their cultures and in their economic self-reliance and development. Governments shall . . . ensure that these activities are strengthened and promoted.
Second, the UN Declaration and the ILO Convention make clear that indigenous peoples have the right to participate and to be consulted in relation to decision making in matters which would affect their rights. 157 Third, a common thread in these two instruments is the right to effective remedies and to an effective legal protection of the individual and of the collective rights of indigenous peoples. 154 ILO C169, supra note 19, at art. 8.2 ("These peoples shall have the right to retain their own customs and institutions, where these are not incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national legal system and with internationally recognized human rights.").
155 UNDRIP, supra note 19, at art. 20. 156 See id. at art. 24. 157 See id. at arts. 18, 19; ILO C169, supra note 19, at arts. 6, 7. 158 See UNDRIP, supra note 19, at art. 40; ILO C169, supra note 19 art. 12. G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l
II. General International Human Rights Supervisory Mechanisms
As earlier noted, the UN Declaration is not legally binding and only a small number of EU member States have ratified the ILO Convention. Nevertheless, alleged violations of the abovementioned rights can be-and have been-assessed in the judicial and quasi-judicial practice of general human rights supervisory mechanisms.
The Human Rights Committee (HRC), 159 for instance, has addressed indigenous peoples' rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in the context of minorities' right to enjoy their own culture (Article 27).
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In the early case, Kitok v. Sweden, the HRC affirmed that economic activities may come within the scope of application of Article 27 "where that activity is an essential element in the culture of an ethnic community."
161 This approach is also confirmed in Ominayak v. Canada, in which the "Committee recognize [d] that the rights protected by Article 27, include the right of persons, in community with others, to engage in economic and social activities which are part of the culture of the community to which they belong." /197/1985 (1988) . may require positive legal measures of protection and measures to ensure the effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect them.
163
The Committee also explains the relationship between Article 27 (rights of minorities) and Article 1 (self-determination) of the ICCPR when applied to indigenous peoples. It maintains that the right to self-determination belongs to all peoples (not to minorities) and is not a cognizable right under Protocol I of the ICCPR; however, provided that members of indigenous communities constitute a minority within a State party, their rights are protected under Article 27 of the Covenant. 164 Notably, several years later, while reconfirming the non-justiciable character of Article 1, the HRC also acknowledged that the provisions of Article 1 may be relevant in the interpretation of Article 27. 165 It thus provides broader space for the protection of indigenous peoples' rights under the Covenant.
HRC jurisprudence also clarifies the scope of State duties concerning the protection of indigenous community members' rights and the conditions upon which interference with such rights is permissible under the ICCPR.
In a series of cases concerning alleged governmental interference with traditional activities carried out by indigenous communities, the HRC has concluded that the freedom of States to encourage economic activities 166 has to be assessed by reference to the obligation in Article 27 requiring that members of minorities shall not be "denied," de jure or de facto, the right to enjoy their own culture accordingly, measures whose impact is so "substantial that it does effectively deny" 167 the rights in Article 27 are incompatible with the Covenant. Moreover, in taking steps affecting the rights under Article 27, States must bear in mind that although certain individual activities may not breach Article 27, when taken together they may have the effect of eroding the possibility for members of indigenous communities to continue to carry out their cultural traditional practices, thus threatening the very survival of such communities. 168 In this latter regard, the HRC has also observed that Article 27 does not only protect "traditional means of livelihood," but it can additionally be invoked in cases where members of indigenous communities may "have adapted their methods . . . over the years and practice [the activities] with the help of modern technology." 169 In a case concerning fishing activities carried out by the Maori people, the HRC confirmed the broad reading of Article 27 and addressed the issue of the alleged interference by the State with the possibilities for Maori to engage in both commercial and non-commercial fishing.
170 Finally, from a procedural perspective, the HRC has clarified that Article 27 implies an obligation for the State to consult with the communities whom the measure is expected to have an impact on and to ensure the communities' effective participation in the decision making process.
171
Even though the HRC has found a violation of Article 27 in very few cases, its considerations elucidate important aspects of the limits on State interference with the cultural rights of the members of indigenous communities and may serve as a source from which other regimes can draw interpretative and supportive arguments. 172 The same may be said with regard to the work of other relevant human rights monitoring bodies, such as the Committee of Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) or the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD).
The CESCR has addressed the protection of the members of indigenous communities while interpreting and monitoring the compatibility of State measures with the obligations enshrined in ICESCR Article 15 on the right to cultural life and ICESCR Article 11 on the right to an adequate standard of living. 173 The CERD has addressed indigenous peoples' issues G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l violations of the Convention. 175 The CERD has clearly established that States must recognize and respect indigenous distinct culture, that they must "provide indigenous peoples with conditions allowing for a sustainable economic and social development compatible with their cultural characteristics" and that they must ensure that "indigenous communities can exercise their rights to practice and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs." 176 
III. The European Convention of Human Rights
By comparison to international human rights supervisory mechanisms, regional human rights courts are generally endowed with broader and more penetrating judicial powers regarding the legal impact of their decisions on States. Their rulings and judgments are legally binding for the State party specifically concerned, and the execution of the final judgment is subject to further supervision under different political, quasi-judicial procedures or both.
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The disputed measures originating from the two EU regulations have to be enacted in the single Member States, which are also parties to the ECHR. It follows that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) would have been the competent regional court for dealing with the Inuit case from a human rights perspective.
However, it should be noted that ECtHR jurisprudence has dedicated little attention to indigenous human rights issues and has recognized an even smaller importance to the collective dimension of the rights of these groups. One possible explanation may be that at the European level, indigenous peoples' rights have traditionally been of lesser social and political concern in comparison to the issue of the protection of the rights of individuals belonging to national, ethnic, or linguistic minorities.
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In a few cases involving indigenous peoples the ECtHR (and formerly the Commission) has addressed the situation of the Sami indigenous population and examined the issue of alleged State interference with their traditional hunting, reindeer herding and fishing rights under the perspective of the length of proceedings (ECHR Article 6), the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions (ECHR Protocol I, Article 1) and the right to respect for private and family life (ECHR Article 8). 179 An additional case concerned an application made by members of the Inuit community of the Thule district in Denmark, complaining that they had been deprived of their natural resources and cultural heritage (as part of their right to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, ECHR Protocol I Article I) as a consequence of an agreement between Denmark and the United States after WWII for the establishment of a U.S. air base which had forced them to relocate. 180 In these cases, despite clarifying some of the possible rights (e.g., protection of natural heritage and resources), the ECtHR has almost always failed to identify a State breach of the obligations arising from the ECHR.
Instead, some limited but more concrete protection signals can be detected in the ECtHR's case law concerning the right to cultural identity of members belonging to minorities. The fact that the ECHR enshrines mainly civil and political rights has not been an obstacle, as the ECtHR has repeatedly extended and stretched by way of interpretation the scope of those rights to the economic and social domain as well.
For instance, in the Chapman case, the Grand Chamber had to examine the issue raised by a Gypsy applicant under Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and family life), 181 namely, that measures threatening her occupation of her land in caravans affected not only her home and property but also her "private and family life as a Gypsy with a traditional lifestyle of living in mobile homes which allow travelling." 182 Despite finding no effective violation in the concrete case, the ECtHR recognized that ECHR Article 8 protects the right to maintain a minority identity and to lead one's private and family life in accordance with the traditions forming an integral part of such identity. 183 It further acknowledged an emerging international consensus amongst the CoE members in recognizing "the special needs of minorities and an obligation to protect their security, identity and lifestyle . . . not only for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of the minorities themselves but to preserve a cultural diversity of value to the whole community" 184 and implicitly accredited the applicants' suggestion of a reduced margin of appreciation for States. Moreover, the ECtHR recognized that Article 8 entails positive obligations for the State "to facilitate" minorities' way of life, especially as concerns "vulnerable minorities."
185
These principles could have applied to the seals case, involving interference through national measures (related to the EU import ban) with the right to cultural identity of Inuit people however, the human rights' path would have been uncertain, complicated and incomplete for at least three reasons.
First, as just discussed, the ECHR lacks a well-established case law that strongly and extensively protects the cultural, social and economic values of members belonging to minorities and indigenous peoples. In contrast, other regional courts have been proactive and creative in this regard. 186 Second, the procedure would have addressed the situation (1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
in single States, not the overall effects of the EU Regulations because the EU has not yet acceded to the ECHR. Moreover, applicants can bring claims in relation to violations occurred under the jurisdiction of one of the member States, and this would have left out part of the applicants in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others, such as the Inuit indigenous communities of Canada. Third, individual applications to the ECtHR are admissible upon previous exhaustion of effective domestic remedies. This requirement is already quite burdensome for individual applicants by reason of the often unreasonable length of national procedures, but as earlier discussed, the seals case presented an additional layer of complexity because of the intricate combination of domestic and EU legitimacy review procedures.
IV. Human Rights Protection Under EU Law
Apart from the formal locus standi issues discussed in Part D, from a human rights perspective the protection of indigenous peoples' rights may be grounded on different provisions of the EU treaties and of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter).
Notwithstanding the absence of a specific reference to indigenous peoples in the Charter, the Preamble affirms that the Union respects "the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe." 187 Article 22 of the Charter reiterates that " [t] he Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity." Lastly, Article 7 declares the right to respect for private and family life. 188 Moreover, Article 2 TEU stipulates that "the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity . . . respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities," and Article 167(4) TFEU establishes that " [t] he Union shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of the Treaties, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures." An obligation to consult interested communities before the adoption of EU legislation may derive from this last provision. G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l At a minimum, these provisions imply an obligation not to interfere in a detrimental way with the cultural and economic interests of indigenous peoples. But what if the Union sets the threshold of interference with such rights too high for the purpose of "preventing the disturbance of the internal market" or in the name of non-economic values, such as animal welfare? On the one hand, this raises an issue of compatibility of the obligations established in the EU Charter with the international human rights obligations of EU Member States, 189 including those established in the ECHR. On the other hand, there is a problem of likely competence contrasts between the two European Courts.
While the EU has not yet acceded to the ECHR, the Lisbon Treaty has endowed the Charter with binding force. 190 It should, however, be underlined that the Charter is a peculiar human rights instrument because it is an instrument of Union law that operates within Union law. The Preamble of the Charter stipulates that it is the Union that recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles set out in that instrument, not the Member States in their own right. Indeed, the scope of application of the provisions of the Charter is circumscribed to the areas of State activity ruled by Union law. Article 51 of the Charter emphasizes that: "The provisions of th [e] Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union . . . and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law."
Concerning EU institutions, compliance with the Charter will be a requirement for the validity and legality of EU Directives and Regulations, but Member States remain responsible (for instance under the ECHR or the ICCPR) for potential violations of human rights whether they are implementing Union law or not.
G. Final Considerations
The seals case is a paradigmatic example of the complexity and interrelatedness of different sectors and subject areas of international law, which inevitably have a bearing on the ability of States to freely pursue policies of their choice based on ethical, social or environmental concerns while being compliant with their international obligations. Such complexity can be perceived at least at three levels.
At the EU level, this complexity is apparent in the Union's efforts to develop an integrated policy for the Arctic aimed at coordinating the activities of EU institutions and the different policies that may have an impact on this area. The analysis of the seals case shows that the Union has embarked upon a very narrow path leading to a difficult and delicate reconciliation between the demands for animal welfare, protection of indigenous peoples' rights and measures directed at the elimination of barriers to trade in the internal market. However, the EU is not a system in "a vacuum:" its Member States, and to a certain extent the EU itself, must comply with international obligations-for instance, in the field of trade and human rights.
The latter consideration leads to a second, broader viewpoint on the seals case, namely, that of the twofold issue of intra-system effectiveness and coherence, on the one hand, and inter-system communication in international law, on the other, as highlighted by the seals case. Under the first perspective, the analysis of the seals case has shed light on substantive and procedural gaps within the single systems: The important weaknesses of the review procedure taking place before the ECJ, in particular the requirements for individual standing, the failure to take into adequate consideration the collective dimension of the human rights of indigenous peoples at both EU and COE levels and the "self-contained" character of the WTO system and overemphasis on trade interests.
Under the second perspective, because of its multi-sector impact, the seals case raises the problem of the unity of international law, exemplified in the question of how to reconcile the conflicting interests pursued by State policies with different but contextually applicable obligations under international law. The general picture that emerges is a fragmented one, in which different systems operate on the basis of their own rules with occasional consideration of external sources.
These concerns become rather evident if the seals case is considered from a third viewpoint-the proliferation of judicial courts and bodies as a consequence of the expansion of international law. The lack of circulation of legal solutions and the absence of judicial cross-fertilization between sectors intensifies the above mentioned intra-system weaknesses. Different outcomes are to be expected depending on the focus of each system, which in turn stimulates considerations of opportunity and forum shopping logics and increases the unpredictability of disputes' final outcome. Such loopholes are exploited by single actors, whether individuals or States, and quite often this occurs to the detriment of human rights protection. In the seals case, it is by fortuitous circumstance that Canada's and Norway's economic interests coincide with those of the indigenous populations of the Arctic.
